Religion and the New Global Counterinsurgency
Chris Seiple Tuesday, 2 September 2003
"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."
— Karl von Clausewitz
As the summer ends, Americans have been caught up in a false debate about the number of troops needed to "win the peace" in Iraq. The amount of time spent on this oxymoron reveals how much we Americans still don't understand about the nature of security in the 21st century. Now is the time to revisit the words and phrases we use to describe the portentous global struggle we are now engaged in, ensuring that those words have some relation to its nature. This is foremost the responsibility of both the statesman and commander. Although the President is right to call it a "different kind of war," we are well on our way to making it "alien to its nature."
The words we use to describe the war tell us how we think about its nature and implicitly describe how we intend to fight it. Unfortunately, the words we are now using to describe the war to both the American people and the world audience obfuscate the issue as much as they illuminate. Today the United States of America is said to be fighting a "global war on terrorism," building an "empire," and defeating "dead-enders" with a "new American way of war." Too often these words cloud our analysis and prevent us from properly understanding the nature of this war and how to wage it. In fact, if we are to win this war, we must have a better understanding of such words as terrorism, insurgency, strategy, and, our greatest weapon, religious freedom. We must be willing to mobilize and employ all of the elements of power to wage it. We must be able to effectively communicate the nature and stakes of the struggle. And we must be prepared to make a generational commitment to see it through.
The "Global War on Terrorism"
This phrase is perhaps the most unfortunate to emerge since 9-11. Terrorism is the "calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear."2 It is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Eradicating terrorism is a noble goal, but declaring war on terrorism is nonsensical. Terrorism is a means not an end; a symptom not an enemy.
If we do not wage a specific war against a specific enemy—all the while explaining and explaining again who our enemy is, what their goals are, and why we should work to frustrate those goals—our words will be hijacked for the purposes of others. Already both sides in the Middle East have used President Bush's "global war on terrorism" language to explain their own questionable actions. The Russians have done the same in Chechnya. Nor are these rhetorical escalations a new phenomenon. Who can forget the soaring oratory of President Kennedy's inaugural, compelling us to "bear any burden, pay any price"? Who can deny that this vision provided the foundation for getting involved in Vietnam through assassination or supporting any other dictator who happened not to be a Communist?
We must be very specific about who we are fighting and why. Certainly we are at war, but we are not at war with terrorism. This is a global war and victory requires more than conventional armies and mentalities.
We are in fact engaged in a three-front global counterinsurgency against very specific people and organizations. The first front is the attack on the terrorists themselves and their infrastructure. The second front is the attack on the conditions that make terrorism a viable weapon for our adversaries. The third front is the public diplomacy that explains the first two in a way that builds American credibility and legitimacy, in part, through making this war everyone's and not just America's.
The "New American Way of War"
The quick American victories in Afghanistan and Iraq have been much ballyhooed in the press as the new American way of war, even called the "Rumsfeld Doctrine." There is nothing new about it. The notion of striking quickly and deeply with flanks unprotected, using speed as security, is as old as war itself. Genghis Khan would certainly recognize this form of warfare. So too would the father of the Blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian, as would his one-time division commander, Erwin Rommel, who once told his Afrika Korps to simply "attack, attack, attack."
This kind of "maneuver warfare," while generally anomalous to the American military preference for battles of attrition and annihilation, is by no means foreign to American military leaders, having been practiced by folks like Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, General Patton's 3rd Army in Europe, and the Marine landing at Inchon in Korea. And since the end of the Vietnam War, all services have, to a greater or lesser extent, emphasized maneuver. Make no mistake, the military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq are of the same fabric and equally brilliant. But they are not new.
What these two victories do signal, however, is the arrival of a new expeditionary age. The distance over which U.S. forces can now conduct these maneuvers, and the speed and precision with which they can perform them, is unprecedented. What was once the comparative advantage of the United States Marine Corps is now the modus operandi of all the services—indeed, the Department of Defense as a whole (and soon, if we are to win, the entire national security establishment). Witness the redesign of American bases overseas from huge depots and creature comforts to skeletal springboards for quick response and/or preemptive action. These bases are conceptually reminiscent of Mahan's desire for coaling stations around the world. They smack of both necessity and empire.
The victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, impressive as they were, involved the application of conventional military forces against an enemy who could largely be identified in the course of battle. After each of the "conventional" victories, however—after the adversary had quit the battlefield, melted away, and begun to confront our forces with different tactics—American forces found it far more difficult to bring operations to strategic closure. It turned out that operations in these conflicts were merely battlefield victories, not strategic ones.
The "new" American way of war, then, focused on destruction of conventional armies, may already be obsolete. To keep from making the same mistake that we committed in Vietnam, we must accept that America, for the first time, is fighting a global counterinsurgency in which conventional military capabilities must be subordinate to, and supportive of, the synergistic combination of all the elements of power in support of our wartime policy. This is the new American way of war.
Insurgency
An insurgency features a military force that is not capable of fighting on the conventional battlefield. It uses hit-and-run tactics, counting on a sympathetic people to support them. Chairman Mao once said that "As the fish are among the sea, so too is the guerrilla among the people." Because the people are the center of gravity in this kind of war, it is foremost a psychological one, waged in the proverbial "hearts and minds" through socio-economic-political means. In general, the guerrilla must therefore possess a consistent ideology that not only explains why he is fighting but also provides tangible benefit to the people of the world to come once the guerrilla is victorious (with the latter being more important in the beginning). For example, the Palestinian people support Hamas not so much for their terrorism or their ideology but because of their social and health programs. It is a time-tested way of creating your own sea to swim in.
And it takes time. Mao, who led the most successful insurgency in the history of the world, spent the early years on political programs for the peasants, making his ideas relevant. He also taught his guerrillas to treat the people right. For example, if a guerrilla was visiting a peasant home, it was a rule to always put the door back covering the entrance. Hearts and minds are not won overnight. They are won one life at a time by a sustained and consistent message backed by the same action.
The global insurgency that we face has two distinct levels, the strategic and the operational, with two kinds of insurgent, the international and the local. Strategically, the United States is fighting an international insurgent wherever he reveals himself in the world. These insurgents are of the al-Qaeda kind—well-funded, linked in their hatred of America, and motivated by a truncated religion that Muslims of true faith disavow.
Operationally, the United States is fighting the international insurgent in particular countries where they sometimes work with local or national, insurgents (Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines). The local insurgent (the Taliban or former Ba'athists) may not share the motivation of the internationals, but they have a common enemy in the United States, and, increasingly, they share a common tactic—terrorism—making it hard to distinguish between them. They sometimes also have the veneer of sharing a religion. In the hands of the right political entrepreneur, religion can both unite these two types of insurgent and recruit and retain more of them.
No place better illustrates this confluence of local and international insurgents and the use of terrorism than Iraq, where the internationals are descending. There are many good things going on in the majority of Iraq. But the Sunni (central) portion of the country is full-scale insurgency fought by local and international Sunni's. It will be a key tactical theater in the broader global counterinsurgency. If we are successful there, our broader strategic aims will be materially advanced.
One point, however. Some people insist on referring to the enemy in Iraq as "dead-enders." This phrase is denigrating to our troops who fight and who are killed by them. William Manchester wrote in "Goodbye Darkness" (an autobiography of his time in the Pacific as a Marine) that calling the Japanese troops "fanatics" belittled the bravery necessary to defeat them. I agree. Our adversaries are committed, at times both brave and "fanatical," insurgents. If we don't show respect for the goals and tactics of these insurgents, we will not be able to defeat them.
Counterinsurgency
If you want to catch the fish in the sea, then you'd better learn to think like a fish. Similarly, if you want to suppress an insurgency, then you've got to think like the insurgent, or guerilla. Fighting guerrillas is not something Americans are naturally good at. The examples we have—General Crook along the Mexican border, the Small Wars Manual of the Marines' experience in the Caribbean and Central America during the 1920's and 1930's, David Hackworth's battalion in Vietnam—are too few and forgotten. The actual fighting of the insurgents will require new levels of excellence in intelligence gathering and the adaptation of forgotten tactics to the nature of new operational environments.
At the end of the day, however, fighting these insurgents, as well as winning the war, is predicated on the sea in which they swim—the people. It is the people who will provide the necessary intelligence to find and defeat the insurgents. It is the people who will work with us once it is clearly and repeatedly communicated to them what our purpose is in that particular theater of operations. And it is the people—once educated by their own Sunni and Shiite leaders—who will find the manipulation of their faith by insurgents abhorrent.
There must be a coherent and cohesive application of power, of which military power is but one, and ultimately, minor component. It requires not only the synergistic use of all the elements of national (and yes, international) power, but a comprehensive understanding of the religious environment in which that power will be applied and a profound sense of strategy and the responsibilities of leadership.
Strategy & Grand Strategy
Unfortunately, one does not come across these terms, in a meaningful manner, that often. Without a constant regard for them, however, the war upon which we have embarked can become the ends instead of the means. John Lewis Gaddes, the preeminent Cold War historian, defines strategy as "The process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources." Such a definition allows priorities to result. By definition, strategy is interactive and fluid; it is always changing to best reflect the nature of the environment and thus influence it.
Grand strategy, as Paul Kennedy notes, is "the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements [of power], both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests." Grand strategy requires well-defined policy goals, interim objectives, and measures of effectiveness for each of the elements of power applied. It requires that we wage peace with the same gravitas that we make war.
Leadership
Global polls suggest that most people around the world like Americans but take exception to the policies of their government. Always true somewhere about some government, the polls do show that there is misunderstanding of the stakes involved and the kind of leadership that the United States offers. It also begs a good definition of leadership.
Leadership has been defined many ways. One value-neutral definition is, put simply, the process of getting the job done with what you've got. To my mind, however, leadership is more than this neutral observation. Leadership is the external manifestation of internal values. If one exhibits values, one attracts others who want to experience and/or learn about those values. In short, leaders lead because of who they are. The same is true of nations.
Who is America? For me, America is equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. This opportunity is built on responsible freedom, a freedom that demonstrates tolerance for difference amidst the pursuit of happiness. As George Washington wrote to Moses Seixas and the Newport Synagogue regarding religious freedom in August of 1790: "All possess alike liberty of conscience... For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support." In essence, to be American is to demonstrate tolerance/respect toward the many allegiances the peoples and groups of this land possess within the greater allegiance of one people to one constitution. We pledge allegiance to the nation because it is the keeper of this idea.
It is thus a double-paradox that we must account for as we lead and wage a global counterinsurgency at home and abroad. First, our greatest "weapon" is the concept of responsible freedom and religious tolerance. This weapon, once implemented as a mature civil society, inherently leaves us vulnerable as a society to those who would destroy our ideas. This is the price of freedom, the penalty of leadership.
To wield our greatest weapon in this global counterinsurgency, there must be truth-in-advertising as we account for the reality that many in the world today fear the United States more than bin Laden or North Korea. Ridiculous to most Americans, we cannot dismiss this perception in a war for hearts and minds. Perception is reality. To change this reality—that is, to wage war on the third front of public diplomacy—America must act as the leader that it is, as a "hegemon," not an empire. Not only is this consistent with its founding values, it is the most practical for waging a global counterinsurgency.
Empire and Hegemony
The difference between Republicans and Democrats, the old joke goes, is that the Democrats apologize for the empire. As I watched our special forces come and go from my Tashkent hotel in the aftermath of 9/11, it was hard to deny that American power reaches the most remote places, i.e., that America is an empire. "Empire," however, is a two-dimensional word from a by-gone era characterized by the hard ground and hard power of geography and military might. While these characteristics remain the foundation of global stability, they alone do not accurately embody the American idea and thus our leadership.
In an empire, mirror images and military solutions dominate foreign policy. In the Vietnam War movie "Full Metal Jacket," for example, the battalion commander tells the private: "Don't ya know son, inside every Vietnamese national is an American trying to get out. Now jump on board for the big win." In an empire, bigger military hammers are needed everywhere as every nuance of policy takes on the form of a nail. Hegemony is different because it leads from within, applying a true grand strategy in which the military is not the piggy-back, or piggy-bank, for every other element of national power.
We are living in an era of accidental American hegemony. Hegemony has come to mean a regional or great power's influence over other states. But its Greek root, hegemon, simply means "leader." Hegemony is leadership. American hegemony is accidental because it was not sought. But like it or not, America is the 800 pound gorilla on the world stage, and its action or inaction will influence every major issue in the world.
Responsible leadership, however, begins with the organization we use to implement our national power here and overseas. For any organization to be effective, it must be organic. An effective organization is not "alien to" the nature of the environment in which it is applied. Our problem today is that we think the way we're organized—and we are still organized to win the Cold War.
We have lost the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq because we did not think through, or fund, the other elements of national power to do their job. As a result, the military gets left holding the bag despite the fact that it is not educated or trained for such missions. And while such missions are normal amidst the transition from war to peace, their continuation by military means helps no one. Beyond literally hurting the military, it is at this point that we begin to lose the initiative with the very people we are trying to help. Today we are in danger of filling the swamp rather than draining it.
If we are to get our military back to its comparative advantage of breaking things, then we have to operationalize the relevant elements of power in order to build things, namely states. For that to take place, we need a new kind of interagency specialist, one who (a) thinks holistically across the elements of power, (b) takes into account the interrelated dimensions of theaters of operations (e.g., the socio-economic-political dimensions of Iraq and how they inform our actions as well as our public diplomacy), and (c) understands the bedrock role of religion—both positively and negatively—in today's global challenges.
There is but one way to create such a specialist: through "joint" education. Only education changes behavior. We absolutely need the Goldwater-Nichols equivalent for those involved in the interagency. (The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that military personnel who want to be promoted to the highest ranks be educated together). The result is a common culture based on common words and common understandings. As Lord George Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General, told reporters in Kabul this past July, NATO is effective because of their "habit of training and educating together."
In sum, Hegemonists are holistic, educated to comprehend and work effectively in cultures that seek freedom in their own way. Hegemonists understand that rule-of-law is transcendent while democracy, perhaps, is not. Hegemonists recognize that this global insurgency is religious and that it will require a better understanding of religious freedom if we are to be secure.
Religious Freedom: The Missing Dimension of Security
The missing ingredient to our global counterinsurgency's grand strategy—ironically enough for this hegemon of persecuted origins—is religious freedom. Thomas Jefferson called religious freedom the "first freedom," for where there was religious freedom so too was there the right to gather, associate, and have freedom of the press. Two critical issues, however, prevent us from incorporating this primus inter pares value into an operational grand strategy. First, while tolerance is what we seek, terror is the other side of the religious freedom coin. It was too much religious freedom in Northwest Pakistan that allowed the madrassas to teach rote hate. It was an American-constructed constitution in Japan that protected the religious sect Aum Shinriyko from investigation as it grew into a billion dollar entity that eventually used saran gas in the Tokyo subways. The potential for a truncated religion to be legally protected as it sows actionable hate is in the seed of every form of tolerance that we plant.
Second, in our own society, we fear introducing religion into any discussion, especially in interagency circles, because it might impugn the separation of church and state, a wailing wall that too many worship. In Iraq, for example, Sheik al-Sadr—the son of the Iraqi Shiite Ayatollah assassinated by Hussein in 1999 for having a network that transcended tribal and religious divides—wants to establish an Institute for Religious Tolerance with Sunni colleagues in order to address the root causes of the violence. It is next to impossible for our government to support because it includes the word "religion." We have reached the tragic-ironic point where we cannot pursue national security interests related to religious freedom because it might threaten the Constitution.
We have separated church and state in the name of good governance with good result. But the casualty has been analysis and we will soon suffer additional casualties if we do not address religion and religious freedom as a realpolitik factor. U.S. national policy must find a way to incorporate these factors into our grand strategy. By encouraging a culturally congruent form of religious freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq, we ask the people to celebrate the best of their faith. As we do so, we take away the recruiting pool of the insurgents because people better versed in their faith will not fall for perversions of it. As they learn more about their faith, they will recognize it as a faith that calls for the tolerance of others.
It will take time. And it will take nuance as we partner with the right Muslim leaders without co-opting them by sheer association. But not to take this kind of action is to ignore the realpolitik reality of this global insurgency, while forgetting who we are and where we came from. Besides, a mature understanding of religious freedom is the greatest preemptive weapon against religious terrorism that we, and the world, possess. It drains the swamp.
Conclusion
The words we use are important. Our current clichés do not reveal the nature of the security environment we live in and, in fact, camouflage it with Cold War concepts that invite failure. We are waging a different kind of war. That war is a global counterinsurgency and it requires a grand strategy that incorporates all the elements of national power as well as a much better understanding of religion. Wielding this national power adroitly will require a reorganization of our national security establishment and the creation of new interagency leaders. It will not be easy and it will take time. But we can and will win because the key to winning this war—religious freedom—is already a part of us. We just have to remember.