Shi'a Iraq: The Greater Middle East Context
Nate Hower-Haken Friday, 28 January 2005
Iranian expatriate Cyros Amiri has long understood what American foreign policy makers have only recently begun to fully appreciate: the importance of the Sunni/Shi'a dynamic in the greater Middle East region. But in order to be successful, analysis must not rely solely on external perspectives and empirical generalization. Rather, the dynamic needs to be understood from the perspective of Middle Easterners themselves. As Amiri explained to me in an interview, "You have to use their mentality. If you use your mentality, you cannot make a perspective."[1] Amiri has learned that in America "everything is different." In America, we live differently. We speak differently. We think differently. We have a different set of memories, a different hierarchy of values, a different matrix of priorities. Americans must not underestimate the extent to which the starkly different socio-religious context of the Middle East shapes individual and collective worldviews and behavior. Amiri's bio is a case in point. Back in his home country of Iran, he revolted against the Shah, fought Iraq in the trenches, and collaborated with the underground opposition movement against the Ayatollah. He has been wounded on the battlefield, imprisoned for disobeying orders to endanger Kurdish civilians, beaten in police stations, lost friends and been culturally and geographically displaced. Americans might be tempted to think Amiri has led an unusual life, but he insists there is nothing special about him; he is only one among many. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the subsequent exercise in democratic nation-building, have brought that nation's Sunni/Shi'a conflict onto the radar screen of American foreign policy makers, who are scrambling to understand what a Shi'a-dominated Iraq might mean for the region and for U.S. national interests. But the warnings of people like Amiri are ignored at U.S. policy makers' peril: the implications of a rise in Shi'a power will only come into focus when seen through Middle Eastern lenses, and in light of the regional and historical context.Shi'a vs. Sunni
The origins of the Sunni/Shi'a split go all the way back to the beginning of Islam. After the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 C.E., there was a disagreement about who should take his place as leader of the Muslim people. The Shi'a determined that the caliphate line should pass to Muhammad's descendants via his cousin Ali. Although the line of Ali dissolved in 873, the Shi'a continue to elect a formal clergy bestowed with divine authority, especially within the Usuli sect of Shi'ism, which is predominant in Iran and Iraq. The Sunni hierarchy, on the other hand, is decentralized like the various Protestant denominational churches in the Christian faith.[2] The Sunnis consider the Shi'a to have lapsed theologically and to apply undue emphasis on the martyrdoms of the early Muslim fathers. The Shi'a feel that they are more devout than the Sunnis. According to Vali Nasr, a professor of Middle Eastern and South Asian politics at the Naval Postgraduate School, there are far more Shi'a in the Gulf region than Sunnis. Even so, the Sunnis have been the ones in control of the politics and culture of the region at least since the British pulled out after World War II, and reportedly for hundreds of years. "From the marshes of southern Iraq to the ghettoes of Karachi, the Shi'a have been the underdogs — oppressed and marginalized by Sunni ruling regimes and majority communities."[3] The Iranian revolution of 1979, which established the first major Shi'a power in the region, threatened the status quo of Sunni preeminence. Nasr argues that this development invigorated the Shi'a populations in neighboring countries to agitate for religious freedom, triggering a Saudi-backed Sunni crackdown, which crushed the Shi'a movements in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia directly facilitated this Sunni backlash, Nasr says, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Saudi Wahhabis exported Sunni theology and militancy to South Asia during the Cold War. This rubric sets Iran against Saudi Arabia as the two hegemons in a sort of Cold War of their own, with Iran trying to support Shi'ism in countries like Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia doing the same in countries like Iraq. In the Iran/Iraq war (1980-1988), for instance, Saudi Arabia supported Sunni Iraq against Shi'a Iran. During the war, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia came to a head in the 1987 haj to Mecca (the holiest of Muslim shrines), when Saudi security forces cracked down on a Shi'a demonstration, killing over 400 people.[4] In the Gulf War (1990-1991) Saudi Arabia again supported Sunni interests in Iraq against the Shi'a. "Even after the liberation of Kuwait, Riyadh was instrumental in convincing Washington to back away from its promises of support to the 1991 Shi'a uprising against Saddam's regime in southern Iraq and in persuading Washington to defend Sunni domination in Baghdad."[5]
U.S./Shi'a Relations
Iran and the United States have a long history of mutual distaste (though reportedly the majority of Iranian citizens are very pro-American). Former CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack attributes much of Iran's resentment of the U.S. to the CIA's roll in backing the coup against democratically elected Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 which ushered in the Shah, who ruled brutally until he was forced to flee in the revolution of 1979.[6] The Islamic Republic that took over adopted an extremely anti-American position, which ultimately led Reagan to declare it a sponsor of international terrorism in 1984 and effectively freeze Iran out of the international community. But now, history has taken a turn. Iraq is on the cusp of elections and will vote along religious lines. As Iraq becomes Shi'a, there will be an upset of power throughout the entire region. "There will be a balance between the Sunnis and Shi'a," Amiri said. Considering our commitments in the region, Iran will suddenly become vital to our success. "We can help you with Iraq and we can help you with Afghanistan," Amiri said. An independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations has come to much the same conclusion. Iran "could play a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad. It might be induced to be a constructive actor toward both Iraq and Afghanistan, but it retains the capacity to create significant difficulties for these regimes if it is alienated from the new post-conflict governments in those two countries."[7] The task force advocates that we begin negotiations to lift sanctions and increase economic investment in Iran while advocating for democracy without the rhetoric of regime change. The report suggests that talk of regime change might galvanize Persian nationalism (a powerful force in Iran) and be counterproductive to our purposes. The U.S. has traditionally felt that it could safely hold Iran at arm's length and wait for the inevitable and imminent collapse of the regime. The young people of Iran (60% under the age of 24) are famously progressive. These young people have consistently voted for the most liberal candidates available in recent elections. In 1997 they overwhelmingly elected the reformer Mohammad Khatami to the presidency. But these progressives have been disappointed by the impotence of their liberal candidates to effect change in the theocratic structure of Iranian government.[8] Consequently, many have disengaged from politics, assuring the conservative regime's survival at least in the short term. The Council on Foreign Relations, therefore, suggests that we shift gears and engage the Islamic Republic in a fresh new way. We need them and they need us. Maybe, in doing so, the task force suggests, we will be able to apply diplomatic pressure for change in Iran and persuade them to bring their nuclear ambitions to a halt. Amiri warns, though, that if there is no regime change, in the long term Iran might draw Iraq back away from democracy. Be that as it may, given the urgency of the short-term risks — the tenuous nature of stability in Iraq — we have to work with the ones already in place. We have no real choice.U.S./Sunni Relations
As far as the U.S. was concerned, back in the 1980s the face of Islamic militancy was Shi'a. Shi'a radicals in Tehran took 52 American hostages in 1979. Iran supported the Shi'a Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, which was responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 17 Americans. Hezbollah is suspected to have been involved in bombing the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 killing 241, and bombing the embassy again in 1984. Shi'a militants hijacked airplanes in 1984 and 1985, diverting them to Iran and Lebanon. Consequently the United States developed close ties with Saudi Arabia, the center of Sunni Islam, while alienating Iran. According to Nasr, when Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1988, the Shi'a militancy movement fizzled out. And what we failed to realize until too late on September 11, 2001 was that Sunni militancy has been picking up steam in the last 15 years. Some radical Sunnis want to overthrow the more liberal Sunni regimes in the Middle East (such as in Algeria in 1990). Some radical Sunnis are anti-West. But perhaps it would be helpful to see these movements as being primarily anti-Shi'a. As Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Scott Doran has said, "Radical Sunni Islamists hate Shi`ites more than any other group, including Jews and Christians. Al-Qaeda's basic credo minces no words on the subject: 'We believe that the Shi`ite heretics are a sect of idolatry and apostasy, and that they are the most evil creatures under the heavens.'"[9] The Sunni militants in Iraq (even those from abroad) are not merely trying to frustrate the United States' efforts for democracy. It is not merely that they "hate freedom." Viewing the conflict through the prism of this centuries-old, region-wide religious conflict will go a long way towards rendering a certain logic, a method to the madness. To inquire whether the insurgency is made primarily of "Baathist elements" or "foreign terrorists" is to oversimplify the dynamic. Both groups have things in common. The Iraqi Sunnis realize that they cannot win a popular election in Iraq so they are disengaging from the democratic process. Militant Sunnis from abroad have come to their support.Next Steps
The Bush administration is optimistic that a democratic Iraq will make the people of Iraq happy, which will affect the neighboring countries for the better. This is, indeed, a possible scenario. It is essential, however, that we do not oversimplify the situation. Like Amiri said, we must "use their mentality" if we want to find an answer. We must consider the dynamic from their point of view, learning their memories and adopting their priorities. The good news is that the Shi'a seem to be ready for democracy. Now it is essential that we bring the Sunnis on board. Furthermore, if we want democracy to work in Iraq, we need to build bridges to Iran without burning those with Saudi Arabia. We need to crush the insurgents while addressing their legitimate concerns. We need to use carrots and sticks with the virtuosity of a juggler and with the flexibility of a contortionist. The mission can be accomplished, but we need to understand what Amiri understands if we want to succeed.
1. Cyros Amiri. Personal interview. 10 December 2004.
2. Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin, "The Origins of the Sunni/Shia Split in Islam," Islam for Today, 16 December 2004, at http://www.islamfortoday.com/shia.htm.
3. Vali Nasr, "Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004): 7-24.
4. Jack Cahill. "Canadian Pilgrims Blame Police for 'Mecca Massacre.'" The Toronto Star, 29 August 1987.
5. Nasr, "Regional Implications." It should be mentioned, though, that the level of tension between Sunni and Shi'a in the Muslim world does depend on what country you are talking about. In North Africa, for instance, where the Shi'a make up a very small number, the conflict occupies little to no space in the collective consciousness.
6. Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004).
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert M. Gates, and Suzanne Maloney, "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2004.
8. Nazila Fathi, "Let Down by Iran's Leader, Young Advocates Leave Politics," The New York Times, 26 December 2004, at www.nytimes.com.
9. Michael Scott Doran, "The Saudi Paradox," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83 (Jan-Feb 2004): 35-51.