Political Islam, Reconsidered
Peter Nasuti Tuesday, 5 July 2005
"The recent violence in Uzbekistan has once more drawn attention to the role of Islam in Central Asian politics. The Uzbek government has predictably blamed the disturbances in the town of Andijon on Islamic militants and justified its crackdown in the name of stability. International observers have described poverty, rather than Islamic radicalism, as the motivation for the protests, and many of them have stressed the traditionally moderate role of Islam in the region. While this analysis is probably correct, it should be understood that cultural forms of Islam may be insufficient to meet the challenges of life in Uzbekistan, and therefore the growth of ""political Islam"" should not necessarily be equated with a victory for terrorism.
The practice of Islam in Uzbekistan adapted itself to seventy years of life under the Soviet Union. Restrictions on public expressions of belief sent Islam underground. It demonstrated itself most strongly in a cultural form of Islam expressed through private rituals, which Uzbeks have preserved in the post-Soviet era. An imam is present at most weddings or funerals, and Muslim holidays such as Eid or Ramadan are widely celebrated. Non-doctrinaire behaviors, such as the observance of the omen prayer after meals or the pilgrimage to holy sites, have also maintained a prominent position in the culture. Such activities have helped to define an Uzbek identity in the post-independence era.
At the same time, these practices do not address many of the real challenges that the citizens of Uzbekistan face. Poverty has increased throughout the country, with the average monthly wage equivalent to only $30. Corruption is endemic as well, and those without connections lack possibilities for advancement. Government regulations hostile to the business climate have created few opportunities of any kind. Expressions of political dissent are similarly restricted. State laws and informal official pressure deny Uzbeks rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. The observance of cultural Islam does not help Uzbeks to transcend these difficult daily realities.
Other potential resources have proven similarly ineffective. The international community has hoped to build civil society through the introduction of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the implementation of grants. However, these efforts are often built upon the desires of those external to Uzbek society, which may differ greatly from those Uzbeks themselves hold. As a result, many of these projects have failed to make a real change in the quality of life in Uzbekistan. A small industry has even emerged of talented Uzbeks writing fake grant proposals so they and their associates can hoodwink wealthy international donors into giving them money and resources.
This lack of culturally appropriate responses to social problems has led some citizens of Uzbekistan to embrace fatalism. Discouraged about the prospects for change, these people attempt to provide for their families and dependants as best they can within the system. Such an approach is problematic, as it does nothing to challenge the prevalence of injustices. In addition, the most needy members of society, who have no one to turn to, run the very real risk of not having enough to survive.
Among those Uzbeks who resist fatalism, a growing but still small faction is finding political Islam to be an attractive coping and response mechanism. In Uzbekistan political Islam involves religiously motivated advocacy for change in the Uzbek sociopolitical system. Unlike ideals of human rights that have never been widely accepted in Uzbekistan, Islam has had a historic presence in the region. Many famous scholars of the first few centuries of Islam, such as Ibn Sina, came from the area, and in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an Islamic reform group, the Jadids, worked to implement social changes. The new Islamists can be seen as reviving that agenda.
Unfortunately, after a long period of Soviet atheist rule, knowledge of Islam in Uzbekistan has become quite primitive. The first political Islamic movements to arise in the region, therefore, did not have well-established theology behind their attempts to effect change. Rather, these groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir, followed a radical form of Islam that lent itself easily to extremism, and, in the case of the IMU, terrorism. This has caused both mainstream Uzbeks and outside observers to obtain a strongly negative picture of political Islam in the country.
It should not be overlooked that these groups make valid criticisms of the Uzbek government. Until recently, they have been the most vocal internal critics of the Karimov regime, especially of the harassment and torture of observant Muslims. At the same time, many of their goals are unattractive to Uzbek society and at odds with true Islam. Their major aim is to establish a caliphate in the Central Asian region, an idea most Uzbeks see as irrelevant to their daily concerns. As a recent Nixon Center report on Hizb ut-Tahrir shows, several of their theological practices contradict the Qur'an and reputable Muslim scholarship. In addition, their rhetoric is often strongly anti-Semitic and anti-American, whereas the population of Uzbekistan has long had peaceful relations with its Jewish minority and has had strongly positive impressions of the United States. Finally, the methods by which they hope to seize power, as well as their political platforms for the country, are generally vague and overly abstract.
For these reasons, radical Islam does not represent a serious ideological challenge to the current state of affairs for most Uzbek Muslims. Although some people have joined the groups out of sheer desperation, and a small minority has been attracted to their ideology, the majority of Uzbeks consider the government and their current situation to be the lesser evil. It is true that the membership of the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir may grow if and when socioeconomic conditions in the country deteriorate further. In addition, the violence of the IMU gives it visibility beyond its small number of supporters. At the same time, however, the failure of extremist movements to promote real justice has led some Uzbeks to a deeper study of Islamic values and a more constructive response.
One such person was Akram Yuldashev, the founder of the Akramiya movement (which the government accused the detainees in Andijon of following). Yuldashev was strongly opposed to the corruption of Uzbek society. In the 1980s, he refused to pay bribes in order to obtain a place at university. His anti-government sentiments led him to associate with the founders of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the late 1980s. After a couple of years, however, he became disillusioned with the group. He especially resisted their call for an Islamic caliphate, as he saw the Qur'an as opposing state coercion in religion. For the next three years, he studied the Qur'an in depth while working on a pamphlet, ""The Path to Faith,"" designed to expose the errors in the radical approach and present an authentically Islamic call for a just society.
This tract was to have a significant effect in Yuldashev's hometown of Andijon. It rejected an overtly political approach to combating injustice. Instead, it stated that devout Muslims should work hard, treat their employees fairly, and then use the traditional Islamic practice of zakat, a form of charity, to give back to the needy in their community. A number of businessmen have since followed this advice, claiming that Yuldashev's book helped them to find meaning and direction in their lives. One mentioned how it led him to improve wages and living conditions for the workers at his bakery. These people met periodically to study the Qur'an and pray, and they became well respected in the Andijon community for the opportunities they provide and their charitable work.
But the growing influence of these businessmen represented a threat to the absolute power of the government. Yuldashev was arrested in 1997 on charges of drug possession, which he said the police planted on him. Freed after several months, he was taken into custody again in 1998 as a suspect in a string of bombings in Tashkent, and he has remained in prison. Those who know him, however, stress that he had disclaimed any connection to such radicalism and that the charges were most likely politically motivated. Several of his followers were subsequently arrested on similarly spurious charges. Protests for their release sparked the events that led to the Andijon massacres of May 2005.
In attempting to find an alternative to authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, the international community is right to condemn the intolerant ideology of radical Muslim groups. It should not fall into the trap, however, of completely ignoring the role of Islam in working for social change, or of stressing the value of a private sphere of ""cultural Islam"" over a public one of ""political Islam."" On the contrary, religion has an important role to play in formulating a culturally acceptable opposition to injustice that does not collapse into fatalism. The example of Yuldashev shows that the practice of Islamic principles can indeed introduce real benefits into Uzbek society.
For this reason, although the West cannot by itself dictate the path Uzbek beliefs will follow, it should identify regional Islamic leaders who are attempting to better understand and implement the call to social justice found within Islam. Diplomats and other members of the international community should work to build ties with respected Islamic figures such as Yuldashev. These local citizens have the potential to combine both external and internal support to create an effective movement for change that even the authoritarian regime would not be able to ignore. In addition, the introduction of an international exchange program for Muslim scholars, presented to the Uzbek government as a means of decreasing the spread of radicalism, could help to develop a new generation of Islamic leaders. Such efforts would help create a feasible and positive vision for Uzbekistan, and therefore benefit both Uzbeks and the wider world."