From Fear to Freedom: Islam in Central Asia
Anna Littauer Carrington Wednesday, 1 October 2008
Central Asia has become more prominent on the foreign policy agenda as the U.S. and the international community focus on terrorism, energy security, and the rise of regional powers. Many current security analyses focus on the threat of Islamic radicalism, and the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have all established regimes with varying levels of religious repression. The role of traditional Islam and the cooption of Islam by authoritarian governments are, however, overlooked elements in the post-Soviet order in Central Asia.[1]
These governments—and outside actors—fail to defend the rights of ordinary Muslim believers and fail to recognize their potential in helping to create a stable society. U.S. policy makers, NGOs, and others in the international community need to recognize the unique cultural Islam that defines Central Asian people, reconsider the simplistic "security" view of Muslims in Central Asia, and reassess how they (with the region's governments) can encourage safe, stable societies built on a foundation of religious freedom. As the historical center of the region, populous Uzbekistan sees itself as the natural leader of Central Asia. Uzbekistan's strategic importance renders it a useful bellwether when discussing Islam in the region and U.S. engagement. While the discussion below seeks to provide an overview of the region, specific examples from Uzbekistan are used to provide detail and explore possibilities.
Recognizing Cultural Islam in Central Asia
In order to refine policy and successfully build relationships, those engaging the region must examine the roots of Central Asian Islam and how it is practiced by ordinary citizens today.
Islam in Central Asia differs substantially from the more well-known branches of Middle Eastern Islam, but its history is equally rich. Islam arrived in the region as a result of Arab conquests of Iranian and Turkic groups in the seventh century. Islamic centers of learning developed in Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva (all now in Uzbekistan). Central Asian Muslims spread their religion to invading tribes in the following centuries, including the Mongol tribes.
Russian tsars limited the region's Islamic schools and opposed Islamic reformist movements in the nineteenth century. The strong cultural and intellectual traditions of the faith began to erode.[2] Under Soviet rule Central Asian Islam was crippled still further; the drive toward secularism and atheism led to a dismantling of Islamic institutions, which were replaced with a Soviet-controlled religion apparatus. Central Asians maintained an identity centered on Islam, but its practice was often limited to religious ceremonies marking important life events and folk traditions. Few followers understood Islamic doctrine and the basics of their faith.
In the 1980s, during perestroika, Soviet policy toward Islam softened as authorities encouraged a moral climate by establishing Muslim institutions and re-opening mosques. Then in 1991, the Central Asian states were thrown into a hesitant independence when the Soviet Union collapsed. Earlier freedoms allowed during perestroika were curtailed, and restrictions were placed on opposition parties and religious groups, often for political reasons, as former Communist leaders established their authority during the 1990s.
The situation today remains complex, as Islam in Central Asia includes traditional followers, extremist groups, and the state apparatus of official Islam.[3] Islam is at the core of Central Asian self-identity and national heritage, yet "the rhythms of everyday life remain secular in a way that is inconceivable even in other secular Muslim countries."[4] The majority of Muslims in Central Asia follow a blended tradition stemming from the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and varieties of Sufism. This tradition encourages personal piety, emphasizes the role of the community, and tolerates doctrinal disagreements. Followers are less likely than their Middle Eastern neighbors to adhere to strict dictates regarding the practice of Islam. "They are not afraid to have a shot, or two, of vodka."[5] Furthermore, they have integrated folk traditions such as honoring ancestors and visiting shrines.[6]
In order to grasp the complexity of Central Asian Islam in practice, it is crucial to understand its communal aspect and the relationships between average citizens and government. The community structure in Uzbek society may be instructive here, as it highlights the differences between Western-conceived civil society and indigenous forms of civil society. The primary local social network and political construct for a community's concerns is the mahalla. Elders preside over the unit, which may be comprised of a village, a neighborhood, or a city apartment building. Traditional religious practices—including weddings, burials, and the celebration of the ancient holiday of Nov Rus—demonstrate strong communal ties. Local religious leaders are more concerned about the needs of their particular populations than traditional doctrine.[7]
Across the region, one way local ties are reinforced is through clan and/or family networks, which have defined Central Asian society for centuries, as well as other Muslim societies. As waves of conquerors—culminating with the Soviets—swept through the region, families consistently relied on each other—often (though not in every society) through tribal or clan networks. Today, "familial and clan connections fill the void left by the state."[8] For example, last winter in Tajikistan brought severe cold temperatures and an energy crisis, leaving many families without heat or the ability to cook. Struggling citizens borrowed supplies and cash from friends and family when the government failed to resolve the crisis.
There is official separation of church and state in the region, but Central Asian governments have crafted an official version of Islam that both carefully controls Islamic doctrine and seeks to use religion to garner support. In Uzbekistan, ordinary believers and local leaders in the mahalla are under religious oversight from a quasi-government body called the Muftiate, originally founded under tsarist rule. Government officials influence the appointment of religious leaders to the Muftiate, which oversees Islamic doctrine and leadership. This arrangement allows the government to co-opt Islamic leaders and encourage them to promulgate official teachings. [9]
Public profession of faithfulness by political leaders is also noteworthy. The current presidents of the Central Asian republics are former Communist leaders who brought their countries into independence and subsequently adopted a "spiritual side."[10] Uzbekistan's President Karimov, for example, took the presidential oath on the Qur'an in 1992, and went on the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca.[11]
Reconsidering Simplistic Security Perspectives
Central Asian government policy toward Islam is something of a paradox—supporting Islam in an official context, but repressing versions of the religion it deems threatening. Citing the violent history of groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan, use the threat of terrorism to justify repression of all dissidents and any religious groups outside of state-sponsored Islam. Understanding U.S. security interests alongside Central Asian interests and actions is essential.
Security analyses surrounding the "Global War on Terror" have led U.S. strategists to focus on threats from fundamentalist groups in Central Asia, especially the IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. More important, the War on Terror has energized U.S. strategic interest in using Central Asian bases for military operations, especially to support missions in Afghanistan.[12] Consequently, the U.S. finds itself cooperating with Central Asian leaders who, keeping security interests to the fore, have severely limited religious expression for their majority-Muslim populations.
Government supervision of religion occurs on a wide scale. Despite constitutional guarantees of human rights, religion "is less a right to be protected by a constitutional order than an activity to be supervised by the state."[13] Human rights groups and the international media usually focus on the rights of religious minorities, who are often detained, harassed, and unable to educate followers because of literature bans. Non-extremist Muslims operating independently of the state Islam structure get less attention. The conditions for this "parallel Islam" vary greatly among the Central Asian republics, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have stricter enforcement regarding local imams (teachers) and registration of mosques.[14]
During the Soviet era, Islamic teaching was suppressed and driven underground. By establishing an official Islam and simultaneously limiting political expression, Central Asian governments have continued this trend and inhibited healthy dialogue regarding the role of religion in the state. Instead, local teachers promulgate a wide variety of Islamic teaching based on multiple interpretations, some of which are violent. Parallel Islam gains adherents who may be seeking political redress, a more seriously devout form of Islam, and/or a religious belief more divorced from official state control. According to T. Jeremy Gunn, "The more that governments attempt to control official Islam, the less credible it will seem to the population."[15] Regulating Islam, therefore, both limits average believers from learning the rich traditions of their faith and reinforces the threat from underground, politicized groups seeking change through violent means.[16]
The U.S. has not always clearly articulated the link between freedom and security. From the Central Asian perspective, additional freedoms are seen as destabilizing to government and society. For example, Uzbekistan's President Karimov observed the effect of NGOs in the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Kyrgyz "Revolutions" and, in 2004, enacted financial restrictions on NGOs operating in Uzbekistan. Similarly, religious believers "are repressed in Uzbekistan not because they are people of faith but because they represent, to Karimov's mind, a terrorist threat to the state."[17]
Productive engagement in the region requires understanding Central Asian national interests and portraying religious freedom (in this case, increased involvement of non-violent Muslims) as part of a complex dialogue focused on security. Continued suppression of an increasingly dissatisfied populace—one lacking economic opportunities and political expression—will only temporarily protect the status quo.[18]
Reassessing Policy: Foundations for Stable Society
Those with interests in Central Asia need to abandon a myopic focus on fighting extremism and pursue alternate aspects of security. U.S. policy makers, NGOs, and others should examine the potential of Central Asia's citizens to participate in their own form of civil society. They should urge Central Asian governments to allow the Muslim majority (as well as minority faiths) to practice openly and permit religious education as a potential means to long-term security.
First, community structures like the Uzbek mahalla and family networks provide a foundation for a uniquely Central Asian form of civil society. U.S. policy makers and NGOs in the region should recognize the potential of Central Asian people to craft their own model of the public square, based on a history of pluralism and ancient culture, instead of stridently defining "civil society" and "moderate Islam" according to Western paradigms. For example, Chris Seiple notes, "To be Uzbek is to be Muslim. And to be Uzbek is to have a robust and resilient civil society that endures and protects the people of your clan-network, locally, regionally and nationally..."[19] The presence of Western-model NGOs in a particular country does not guarantee a healthy civil society, nor does it guarantee local engagement. Understanding the potential of the local networks also requires a community-based approach that does not see citizens as strictly individual actors.
Second, fostering regional stability requires encouraging healthy dialogue about the role of the Muslim faith in public life. This cannot happen if pious Muslims are suspected of being "Wahhabist" (broadly-applied authoritarian shorthand for "terrorist") for growing a beard and adhering more strictly to Islamic symbols of faith. Indeed, Central Asian governments often see increased piety as parallel to increased political activism.[20] This fuels a cycle wherein frustrated political factions also manipulate religion—just like "official Islam" does—to serve political ends. In many countries, promoting religious freedom means protecting the rights of the minority faiths. In Central Asia, it also means protecting the rights of the majority faith—allowing followers to choose their level of adherence and express their commitment openly.
This protection of religious freedom and healthy dialogue about Islam's role require a third recommendation: encouraging Central Asian governments to allow religious education. In Uzbekistan, there is one well-funded official university focused on Islam's unique cultural heritage, and it primarily enrolls elites who are well-connected.[21] Uzbekistan did make an effort, in 2003, to reform state education concerning Islam. The government developed a curriculum for all levels and a training program for instructors. However, because the government promoted "official Islam" and controlled the Muftiate, the efforts at religious education lacked credibility.[22]
Increased exposure to religious education, then, cannot come solely from government-funded programs. Adherents of particular faiths, including pious, non-violent Muslims, should be allowed to educate their own. Allowing religious education and independent institutions will not guarantee security. Restricting religious education, literature, and unofficial gatherings, however, will ensure a continuing parallel Islam prone to produce dissidents. In the long term, allowing access to the wide variety of opinions within Islam may hamper the growth of a dangerous few.
Islam is at the core of Central Asian identity, and its manifestations are complex. From secularized daily life to extremist adherents to official versions of religion, the long Islamic tradition and social structures that are an enduring part of Central Asian society should inform our a more nuanced view of these countries. Those engaging the region have overlooked both its complexity and its people's potential. The suggestions offered here reflect that complexity and potential, but they are not comprehensive. The U.S., NGOs, and other actors should press Central Asian governments to allow Muslims and those of other faiths to define their communities, practice freely, and educate followers. Such freedom could lead to a flourishing, uniquely Central Asian civil society that ultimately builds regional stability.
[1] This article has been revised since its original publication. 20 March 2009.
[2] Shireen T. Hunter, "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia," SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (2001): 68-69.
[3] Shirin Akiner, "The Politicisation of Islam in Postsoviet Central Asia," Religion, State & Society 31, no. 2 (2003): 97-101.
[4] Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007). 121.
[5] Chris Seiple, "Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking Of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States—Uzbekistan Relations 1991-2005" (Ph.D. diss., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2006), 80.
[6] T. Jeremy Gunn, "Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and the State in Central Asia," Sociology of Religion 64, no. 3 (2003): 395-398.
[7] Seiple, 78-81.
[8] David Szakonyi, "Tajikistan: Not Protesting Enough," Transitions Online, 16 July 2008, (17 July 2008).
[9] Gunn, 405.
[10] The current presidents of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan replaced the leaders from the post-Soviet transition. These new leaders are, however, part of the political establishment and have not yet demonstrated a distinctly different approach to Islam's role in state and society.
[11] Gunn, 402.
[12] Seiple, 203.
[13] Gunn, 403.
[14] Gunn, 406.
[15] Gunn, 406.
[16] Hunter, 70.
[17] Seiple, 170.
[18] For more on the link between religion and security, see http://www.globalengage.org/pressroom/ftp/658-from-the-president-engaging-conservative-islam.html
[19] Seiple, 81.
[20] Khalid, 201.
[21] Khalid, 172.
[22] Seiple, 194.