Updating the Old, Integrating the New: State Secularism and French Muslims
Stephen Wong Monday, 29 June 2009
A wall between church and state can protect the integrity of religion, the sovereignty of government, and the rights of believers. It can also antagonize and alienate citizens. In France, church and state are entirely separate. The policy of laïcité, or secularism, guides everything—from the dress of civil servants to the talking points of elected officials—in the attempt to relegate the church and state to isolated realms. In doing so, laïcité ignores religion's identity-shaping impact on French Muslims. Islam is more than an identity reserved for Fridays in the mosque; it is an all-inclusive belief system and worldview that influences the behaviors and thinking of adherents. The outdated French secularist model needs to evolve into a more benevolent separation that acknowledges Islam's impact on citizen's identity. Such a shift does not have to take place at the national level or through an overhaul of the laws that separate church and state. Instead, provincial governments, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens can effect local change, which will promote the integration of the Muslim population in greater French society. France's strict secularism affects the entire population, but it especially impacts the estimated 5 to 10 percent who are Muslim.[1] By prohibiting faith in the public square, laïcité strips Muslim citizens of their most influential component: their faith. The concept behind laïcité, that an ignored religion is a protected religion, yields an incomplete, reduced identity because French Muslims are not merely political actors. Integration, one of the key goals of the government for its Muslim population, is also exceedingly difficult.[2] The Muslim community must feel accepted in France in order to integrate. If the Muslim population is expected to be fluent in French and celebrate Bastille Day, then the government must foster an inclusive environment that values the contributions of this minority.
Laïcité teaches non-religious people that faith is a mysterious, hidden ritual, and this forced secrecy breeds disdain toward religion among people. Achieving religious understanding and tolerance is not possible by locking Islam behind closed doors, where Muslim leaders cannot openly discuss measures for integration with the greater French society. For example, a seminar on respecting religious difference for employees of a public library would be out of the question in France. With religion adamantly concealed, there is little discussion about commonalities between Islamic and French culture (e.g. the value of family).
France demonstrates its desire to keep religion private through government action that particularly affects Muslims. Muslim girls in France who wear headscarves are widely seen as the main target of Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, which bans displays of faith in public schools. Officially, crosses and kippas are also banned but the law most significantly affects the Muslim community. One Swiss born Islamic scholar clearly articulates the feelings of his community on the law, which is viewed as "a kind of discrimination."[3]
Laws 2004-228 is a reminder that laïcité is not a dead policy. Instead, the policy that allowed liberty, equality, and fraternity to thrive and is invoked and respected today. This reverence of the policy starts at the top; politicians know they "tamper with [laïcité] at their peril."[4] The fear of public backlash keeps politicians from questioning laïcité's wisdom at a theoretical or policy level. The sacred treatment of the French "hallowed secularist tradition" has contributed to the policy's development as the respected and protected religion of the republic.[5]
The French separation of church and state has its foundations in the 1789 French Revolution and resulted from tension over the Catholic Church's role in government and politics. Traditional views gave the church profound control over political decisions; church preferences often translated into government policy. The anticlerical opposition grew increasingly restless with the political authority of the Church.[6] The opposition turned to "anti-clerical militancy," which spurred laws that finally implemented laïcité as an official policy in 1905.[7] The laws have advocated a harsh, absolute view of church-state relations ever since. The laws ban the government from collecting statistics on "church-related" matters, such as the number of religious adherents. The laws gain further legitimacy from custom, such as one that discourages politicians from talking about faith on the campaign trail. Despite its roots in opposition to the 19th century Catholic Church, it is Muslims who are negatively affected by laïcité today.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has openly discussed secularism's effects on French Muslims and has borne significant criticism for doing so. His experiences, as both minister of the interior and minister of finance, impressed upon him the need for an updated policy that better reflects the current state of France. His dialogue on updating laïcité has included difficult questions, such as whether government funding of mosques would breach church and state separation.[8] Sarkozy has said ignoring religion is "madness" and it is "legitimate for democracy and respectful for secularism to have a dialogue with religions."[9] According to the 2008 U.S. International Religious Freedom Report on France, "President Sarkozy has persistently pursued reform of the official policy of secularism, arguing for a wider public role for religion in society."[10] Sarkozy's five major speeches on religion and secularism since 2007, including one at the Vatican, have given the discussion a new sense of urgency. His "positive secularism" upset many political opponents who view the term a contradiction.[11] Nevertheless, laïcité developed under unique circumstances that no longer exist. Sarkozy's evolving rhetoric, which claims that changing the policy would benefit the country as a whole, is a promising statement for the French Muslim community's integration.[12]
Shifting rhetoric from leaders like Sarkozy does raise awareness, but actual adaptation is perhaps best carried out at the local or provincial setting. For example, because laïcité forces a secular identity on Muslim students in public schools, many French Muslims have embraced alternative education. Muslim students are leaving "the breeding ground for [French] citizens," the republican (public) school, in favor of private Catholic schools.[13] Many Catholic schools recognize the importance of Islam in the lives of their students. They are able to welcome the similarities between Islam and Christianity and even tolerate the differences. In some schools, headscarves and the use of chapel for salat prayers are allowed. More than 10 percent of students at Catholic high schools are Muslim, according to French educators.[14] A central tool for integrating minority populations has long been the republican schools. Now, many Muslims view the Republic's quest for equality in the public classroom as assimilation rather than integration. The very policy intended to restrain the church and keep all people equal, regardless of religious faith, is driving Muslim students to tolerance found in private parochial schools.
A softer, updated version of laïcité can honor the policy's historical significance, while adapting to current challenge of Muslim integration. For example, the school district in Lyon—where 19 percent of the students are Muslim—added a meatless dish as a lunch option. The addition was marketed to vegetarian students, but intended for Muslim students who maintain halal dietary regulations.[15] This simple development not only accommodated the Muslim lifestyle; it served the secular purpose of keeping all students fed and comfortable in the school environment without requiring a radical countrywide overhaul of the laws.
The French government must recognize how Islam is a central influence in the lives of Muslims if this population is to integrate in French society. Laïcité is valued as a factor in French development and stability, which makes removal difficult at the national level. The provincial governments, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens, however, all have a tremendous opportunity to mitigate laïcité. Lunch options in public schools and the acceptance of Muslim students in Catholic schools are evidence that adaptation is possible. These localized approaches to alleviate laïcité's polarizing effects through tolerance and pluralism integrate Muslims and are beneficial for society. Islam does not have to be sacrificed in order for church and state separation to be maintained; a softer laïcité can serve all its citizens well.
[1] CIA World Factbook. "France," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html
[2] The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. "An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe," October 2005. http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf
[3] "Tariq Ramadan," Prospect Magazine July 2006. http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7571
[4] The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 10.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Jean Babuerot. "Secularism and French Religious Liberty: A Sociological and Historical View" Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 2003, No. 2. http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2003_2.htm
[7] Henri Astier. "The Deep Roots of French Secularism," BBC News Online. 1 September 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3325285.stm
[8] Keith B. Richburg. "Sarkozy to Lead France's Ruling Party," The Washington Post. 29 November 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17762-2004Nov28.html
[9] Robert Marquand. "With Pope's Visit, Sarkozy Challenges French Secularism," The Christian Science Monitor. 15 September 2008.
[10] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State. "2008 Report on International Religious Freedom: France." http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108446.htm
[11] Agnes Poirier. "Vive la laïcité," The Guardian UK. 13 February 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/13/vivelalaicite
[12] Newsweek Magazine. "True Secularist." 10 February 2008. http://www.newsweek.com/id/109501
[13] Katrin Bennhold. "French Muslims Find Haven in Catholic Schools," The Ledger (Lakeland, FL) 30 September 2008. http://www.theledger.com/article/20080930/ZNYT03/809300322?Title=French_Muslims_Find_Haven_in_Catholic_Schools
[14] Ibid.
[15] "When Town Halls Turn to Mecca," The Economist. 4 December 2008. http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12724966&CFID=45199810&CFTOKEN=52636074