Succeeding in the Next Generation of Religious Freedom Diplomacy
Eric Patterson Wednesday, 18 August 2010
For the United States and many of its closest allies, religious freedom is a fundamental right, inextricably linked to a variety of other notions of freedom: worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly, and the like. However, a decade after the U.S. formally committed to championing religious freedom abroad, we see little change in the overall global landscape. Accordingly, we need fresh thinking and a forward-looking strategy of religious freedom diplomacy. In this essay, I argue for three key elements of a 21st century strategy to fundamentally change the global balance in favor of religious freedom: (1) developing an academic sub-discipline of international religious freedom studies, (2) engaging big business, and (3) building partnerships with other governments.
A Policy without Results?
Citizens in the U.S. tend to see religious freedom as an inherent right, one that is expressly adumbrated and protected in the First Amendment of the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The U.S. also has a long tradition of supporting religious freedom within the modern human rights framework, most notably as a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Furthermore, because almost every country has signed on to the UDHR (not legally binding) and the ICCPR (a legally binding treaty), the U.S. sees its promotion of religious and other civil liberties as simply calling other countries to live up to their commitments. The U.S. has taken concrete action to promote religious liberty worldwide for nearly four decades, from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Helsinki Accords to the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).[1]
More recently President Obama emphasized in his June 2009 Cairo speech: "Freedom in America is indivisible from freedom to practice one's religion," and he made religious freedom one of seven priority areas of challenge for the Muslim world. The president argued, "People should be free to choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the soul," and he approvingly cited the ways that religious freedom is good for a society: respect for others, tolerance for diversity, interfaith dialogue, and "interfaith service ... [such as] combating malaria in Africa, or providing relief after a natural disaster."[2] Broadcast viewers of the speech saw and heard the thunderous applause that greeted this point of the speech.
Nonetheless, a year after the President's speech and a decade after IRFA's passage, the U.S. has been largely unsuccessful in convincing other governments and other societies to structurally and systematically change their religious freedom policies. Indeed, by Freedom House's measurement, the world has generally become "less free" in recent years rather than "more free."[3] How can U.S. policy be more successful?
First, the U.S. may have unrealistic expectations about global change on the religious freedom issue. We cannot assume that other societies will evolve in this narrow area—legally and culturally respecting religious difference and practice—with no simultaneous change in wider patterns of culture, regime, and regard for human rights.
Issues of religious liberty, diversity, and public practice are intertwined with a wider set of political and cultural issues, including a sense of national identity, the relationship of an established church to the state, immigration and entry of foreigners, financial remittances, and the character of development and humanitarian assistance. This does not mean the U.S. should not champion religious freedom; rather, this is an observation that such complexities are often poorly understood or disregarded by Western diplomats and human rights organizations (particularly secular ones). What is needed is increased attention to the wider network of issues related to religious freedom, particularly in the training of U.S. diplomats as they engage other countries on principles of liberty.
Of course, national interests are the critical lever in at least two ways. First, one of the reasons that government elites have neglected religious freedom policy is because it has not neatly fit into the realpolitik (political realism) mindset to which many in the security and diplomatic corps subscribe. But it is clearly in the U.S. national interest to see fundamental human liberties enshrined within the rule of law worldwide. National interests are a critical lever in a second way: the U.S. should behave in ways that make it clear it is in the interest of our partners to embrace religious freedom. To date, however, moral suasion without teeth has been the U.S.' primary vehicle for promoting international religious freedom. What has not been done effectively is to change the structure of global persecution and restriction, either by duress or winsome diplomacy.
In short, the U.S. has hoped for lasting moral change on the issue but has had little leverage on changing culture or state interests when it comes to international religious freedom. Moreover, unlike some political and social causes, there is no consolidated constituency of voters and donors to punish Capitol Hill and the White House for failure. The situation is compounded by citizens' and foreign policy experts' poor understanding of the issues, For example, some government officials wrongly think religious freedom advocacy violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. To counter misperceptions both at home and abroad, international religious freedom advocates need a retooling of international religious freedom promotion in the areas of academia, business, and multilateral partnerships.
International Religious Freedom Studies as an Academic Discipline
In the 1980s a group of scholars, some of whom would later become known as the Copenhagen School, began to increasingly focus on threats to "human security" rather than focusing on superpower rivalry as the sine qua non of international security. Twenty years later one can earn a Masters degree or graduate concentration in human security from major universities in Europe, North America, and Asia, attend panels on human security at major conferences, and read a variety of human security journals. A similar development is needed for international religious freedom studies. An academic sub-discipline of international religious freedom studies would revolve around the shared research agenda of an interdisciplinary (international law, economics, development, comparative politics, cultural anthropology, and the like) network of scholars across multiple colleges and universities. Established scholars would conduct their own original research, encourage graduate students in the field, and get international religious freedom on the agenda of academic conferences. Scholars in the network could publish their work in policy-oriented journals (such as The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Survival, etc.) as well as in peer-reviewed academic publications. On the latter point, it would also help jump-start this sub-discipline if a new peer-reviewed journal based in the U.S. could be established, devoted exclusively to rigorous research on international religious freedom (just as the human security field has created its own set of peer-reviewed publications).
Academic teaching and discussion should take place in undergraduate courses as well. International religious freedom studies should be the primary theme of some college classes and should be a secondary theme in many others, just as human security has gained a wider awareness among undergraduates. Curriculum development will root the study of international religious freedom in academic departments rather than solely at think tanks and advocacy centers. Increased teaching and student interest may encourage some universities to take the lead in developing more formal academic programs on international religious freedom, such as an undergraduate minor, post-graduate certificate, or master's concentration.
Finally, establishing an academic discipline for the future requires financial nourishment. Scholars working in the field should already be seeking grants from existing foundations who might be interested in emerging international religious freedom research due to the quality of the research question. Scholars will have to seek general institutional and government research monies, and thus compete with their colleagues in the marketplace of ideas based on the quality of their research design and novelty of their theses. A first, important step in this area is the recent establishment of the Joseph R. Crapa Fellowship by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). With intellectual, institutional, and financial resources a new generation of thinking and understanding on international religious freedom will emerge.
Engaging the Business Community
On September 30, 2009 Nike resigned from the board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, stating, "We fundamentally disagree with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the issue of climate change. ..."[4] However, Nike committed to maintaining its membership in the Chamber in order to change the Chamber's policy. The Chamber had publicly criticized the Environmental Protection Agency's plan to require mandatory reporting on greenhouse gases from sectors across the U.S. economy.[5]
There are several possible reasons that Nike and other businesses would choose to be eco-friendly; one of them is the lessons learned from a different yet related set of controversies in the 1990s over sweatshops. Nike was hit among its most critical target demographic—university students—when the "sweat-free campaign" began in the 1990s.[6] Parallel efforts by NGOs, such as Oxfam's NikeWatch, collaborated in pressuring Nike through bad publicity. Nike represents one story out of hundreds in the American corporate community where ethically-informed activism, and some government scrutiny, is changing corporate behavior. And not only did Nike change its internal policies, but, according to Business Ethics magazine, it has also become a leader in corporate responsibility.[7] Moreover, companies like Nike often go the next step by partnering with non-profits and local communities through media-reported charitable giving, such as through Nike's partnership with the RED campaign (AIDS funding).[8] The international religious freedom community could learn much from the anti-sweatshop and pro-environment campaigns about how to engage the business sector.
The international religious freedom community should engage multi-national corporations in terms of their interests: positive publicity, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and profit. There are many places where American companies may have levers of influence that are as strong as those of the U.S. government, due to the number of people working in their factories and the ease of moving that infrastructure to a different country in a globalized economy. It is incumbent on religious freedom advocates to demonstrate to corporations how it is in their interest to be publicly supportive of religious freedom. One way to do this is by linking it to a wider human rights agenda—topped by religious freedom—and making the issue publicly visible to major corporations. This should be done in a spirit of partnership but over time such efforts may include a more confrontational approach, such as public calls for companies to make a public stand on religious freedom as a human right and/or to threaten to move their production lines to environs with better human rights records. Companies do not want sustained negative publicity that results in decreased consumer demand, particularly if the issue is tacit support to authoritarian governments violating the fundamental rights of their people.
It is possible that existing U.S. institutions, most notably the independent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, can play a convening role in moving forward a public-corporate agenda on international religious freedom. The Commission's government credentials, network of past and present commissioners, and Washington, DC location make it a possible forum for introducing business leaders to international religious freedom thought leaders and for mobilizing a wider public constituency on the issue.
International and Multilateral Partnerships
When one reads the press releases of USCIRF or the State Department's International Religious Freedom (IRF) Office, it often seems that the U.S. is "going it alone." It seems the U.S. government has to be constantly vigilant to keep the international community from backsliding, such as watch-dogging the UN Human Rights Council's "Defamation of Religions" resolutions.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to catalogue the efforts of the two U.S. government agencies who work on this issue, but two observations can be made. The State Department IRF office invests most of its time and energy in a superb annual report (last year's report was 1,700 pages); USCIRF also reports, issuing its own 400-page document last year. Second, the Obama Administration (like its predecessor) has been slow to nominate an IRF Ambassador, only naming a nominee on June 15, 2010—a year after Cairo. A better division of labor would help the U.S. government develop bilateral and multilateral alliances on behalf of international religious freedom.
First, as noted in the previous section on engaging the business community, the fundamental way to get the attention of elites is through grassroots mobilization. Perhaps a division of labor between USCIRF and the State Department is in order here, with USCIRF consciously choosing to not duplicate State Department efforts (e.g. a lengthy annual report) and focusing its energies domestically on raising awareness through citizen education and grassroots action. It is citizens who can pressure the president and especially Congress to devote more time and attention to this issue. Citizens can also serve—via transnational networks and activism (email lists, church groups, economic boycotts)—as a powerful actor in international civil society on behalf of religious freedom.
Second, neither the State Department nor USCIRF will really be effective engaging internationally without the public, firm support of the White House and the Secretary of State. Clearly this is lacking at present. As Dennis Hoover recently wrote in these pages, what is needed is "strategic vision and political will."[9] The delayed naming of an IRF Ambassador and the lack of clarity over that person's real authority within the State Department only muddies the issue.
International religious freedom advocacy needs an energetic engagement strategy for the next decade, with an empowered Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom at the helm. Others have articulated how that position should be integrated within the State Department.[10] The Ambassador's energies should be directed toward developing and implementing a bi- and multilateral engagement strategy. The Ambassador first must demonstrate to our closest allies that championing religious freedom is in their fundamental interests. It is in their interests, at home and abroad, because a culture of fundamental liberties is a global public good that reinforces the rule of law, good governance, and economic growth. Moreover, it is in their interests to promote religious freedom abroad because it is precisely in closed, repressive societies that the claims of violent religious groups such as al Qaeda are most appealing.
Such an effort must be primarily country-specific, rather than focused primarily on international institutions. The UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and other regional organizations all have statements on behalf of human rights and religious freedom, and many of them have lengthy, weak mechanisms for bringing complaints about religious persecution before some sort of human rights watchdog. But the U.S. must build a "coalition of the willing" in national capitals in order to promote a global culture of international religious freedom.
It is likely that the Ambassador will not find much immediate traction with many of our Western European allies, due to problems that they are having domestically as well as their secularist human rights orientation. However, there is a second set of countries that could prove to be valuable partners in promoting international religious freedom: developing countries where religious groups were in the vanguard against oppression and supported the transition and consolidation of democracy. These include South Africa, Poland, and some South American countries. Such governments may be the next generation of religious freedom leaders on the global stage, and such partnerships make global change on behalf of religious freedom possible.
Conclusion
The U.S. does not need partners in "tolerance," where tolerance means "putting up with" religion. Rather, it needs allies who are champions of religious liberty, advocates who will promote a universal respect for individual and collective religious freedom. The way to build this "coalition of the willing" is to launch a sustained, multi-sectoral approach to international religious diplomacy, led by existing government institutions such as USCIRF and the State Department's IRF Office as well as the wider U.S. citizenry, which will influence Congress and the executive branch to take this and related issues more seriously. When we think ahead to IRFA's 25th anniversary in 2023 and the speeches we would like to give on IRFA's successes, we should imagine a successful international religious freedom diplomacy based on sustained academic analysis and teaching, business leadership, and multilateral strategies.
[1] For a detailed history of the political debate at the time and the establishment of IRFA, see the summer 2008 issue of The Review of Faith & International Affairs 6, no. 2, especially the following essays: Nina Shea, "The Origins and Legacy of the Movement to Fight Religious Persecution" and Laura Bryant Hanford, "The International Religious Freedom Act: Sources, Policy, Influence." These essays derived from the Georgetown University symposia discussed below.
[2] See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/.
[3] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2010: Global Erosion of Freedom," 2010.
[4] Matthew Presuch, "Nike leaves U.S. Chamber of Commerce over climate policy," The Oregonian, 30 September 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/09/nike_leaves_us_chamber_of_comm.html.
[5] The EPA did issue such a rule in 2010. See the EPA's website for details at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html.
[6] See for instance, the Students United Against Sweatshops official site at http://usas.org/about-us/.
[7] Michael Connor, "Nike Corporate Responsibility at a ‘Tipping Point,'" Business Ethics, 24 January 2010.
[8] For details on Nike's charitable giving, see http://www.nikebiz.com/responsibility/community_programs/.
[9] Dennis R. Hoover, "President Obama and Religious Freedom Promotion Since the Cairo Speech," The Review of Faith and International Affairs, web exclusive, 8 March 2010. Available at http://rfiaonline.org/extras/articles/599-obama-religious-freedom-cairo-speech.
[10] An important set of suggestions for U.S. international religious freedom policy, particularly as regards the Ambassador at Large and the Department of State, is Thomas F. Farr and Dennis R. Hoover's "The Future of U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy," a policy report published by the Institute for Global Engagement, 2009. See http://www.globalengage.org/research/reports/829-the-future-of-us-international-religious-freedom-policy-special-report-.html.